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The Politics of Chinese Dissident Drama 
By Zhang Xian. Translated by Tang Ying 
 
 
I began my struggle as an individual playwright upon learning the tragedy of my 
situation some 20 years ago. Politically, I was being buried alive. To be told to say 
nothing, I felt, was the same as dying. At the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
my family became Red Guard targets and were ostracized. I was exiled to remote Yun’an 
in southwest China until 1978, when college entrance exams were reinstated and I 
entered Shanghai’s drama academy. After a couple of years, I was sent back to Yun’an, 
where I was assigned to work in a sweater factory. Nevertheless, I continued to write 
stories, poetry, and plays until I drifted back to Shanghai in 1986.  
Unsatisfied in the 1990s with writing fable plays, which simply related a 
collective weariness, I wrote new works that ran the gamut of styles.  None of them have 
ever been produced in China.  Are these political plays? They are, in the special 
environment of Chinese culture.  Beyond reflecting vague rules of conduct, Chinese 
artists are supposed to act as agents who contribute to expanding China’s advanced 
productive forces and toward raising the people’s ideological and moral standards.  Moral 
lessons, the Chinese government believes, should be contained in any theatrical 
production: if something is deemed illegal in social life, it is frequently deemed illegal on 
stage.  Chinese officials constantly worry that a subculture of disaffected communists 
might arise from the underground and enter the mainstream, so the Communist Party’s 
exertions of its political power and control always reflect its fear that any audacious 
production or any freedom shown on stage might cause some political risk.  
 
When I was arrested 20 years ago in the library of Shanghai Theatre Academy, I 
suddenly understood that everyone in China is living a “National Drama.” While in jail I 
realized that, ever since we were children, we have been actors playing our parts in this 
Super-theatre; we have all been arranged to play faceless roles, the action has to follow 
the director, and everyone speaks and moves in accord.  This “National Drama” is 
directed by a powerful and mysterious will.  It requires us to attend the same national 
ceremony and say the unified actor’s lines. All of our expressions look alike; we wear 
facemasks. Our bodies operate like wooden figures. 
At first I thought of this National Drama as a tragedy, but then later I came to 
understand that it was a comedy, a kind of farce, and I pledged that I should start writing 
my own drama when I got out of jail. It was a drama that would belong only to myself. It 
would be an individual theatre that exists inside and yet is in opposition to the National 
Drama. Because I want my theatre to be a weapon against the autocracy and injustices of 
my society, it would be a kind of anti-drama under the National Drama.  
The subject matter of China’s endless and everlasting National Drama shifts and 
changes, according to the winds of political movements, ranging from Communism and 
Cultural Revolutions to economic reforms. Today the subject is Money. Because they are 
viewed as commercial gambits, some degree of boldness and sexual frankness are 
allowed—every once in a while—to be shown on stage. State-owned theatres mimic 
shows that are initiated and produced by small independent groups, belonging to what I 
call a “civilian theatre,” a notion that is deliberately alternative and counterpoised to “the 
people’s theatre.” For in China, companies that are routinely described as “the people’s” 
are not truly “the people’s” at all, and those who are conscious of their “civil rights,” 
“individuality” and “civil society” are derided as xiao shi min, or “little citizens.” 
Some people say I am a loser. Others consider me a success. But for me, success 
and failure are no different from each other. I would rather spend my all life as a kind of 
“special society performer”—a dissident actor playing his unofficial part in China’s 
National Drama. I write plays with the knowledge that they will be forbidden. I am like a 
social performer always acting on society’s stage and always clinging to my theatrical 
role in the individual struggle against the National Drama.  
In the beginning of 2004, the news from Beijing is that newer reforms will be 
instituted, and all Chinese theatres, which have been owned by the state for 50 years, will 
return to private ownership. This year, central government has cut off all subsidized 
funding for state-owned troupes. Theatrical workers will be thrown to the mercy of 
market forces and no longer belong to any work-unit—they are to become self-supporting.  
Will the theatres still play their part in the National Drama or become the 
independent players? Who knows what will transpire in the next act? Thousands of 
Chinese theatre workers, of course, will do anything for their art, which is also their 
livelihood, and as they explore the borders of the commercial market, and advance to the 
last realm—politics—they will come to understand that the political realm is full of 
commercial potential. 
 
 
